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PERSONS WITHOUT HISTORY:
LIBERAL THEORY AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE*
THOMAS MORAWETZt
For some time and from many standpoints liberalism has been under
seige. It is attacked on both practical and philosophical levels. The last
twenty years have seen the partial eclipse of the liberal Democratic agenda
and the simultaneous erosion of the political label "liberal" as a term of
confident self-regard. Ironically, the same period has seen a revival of
political theory in general and of liberal theory in particular.' The rela-
tionship between liberal practice and theory is complex. Philosophic
liberalism cuts across the boundaries of various practical political agendas;
similarly, the practice of modern liberal politicians is rooted in various
political theories. Certainly liberal theory is not coextensive with the current
liberal political agenda.'
I shall consider whether liberal theory rests on a conception of experience
that is inconsistent with human nature. I am concerned with the implications
of the notion that liberal theory requires governmental neutrality with regard
* © 1986 by Thomas Morawetz.
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For affirmations and reformulations of liberal theory, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); R. DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977) [hereinafter R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS]; R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Dworkin, Liberalism, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Liberalism]. For a comparison of Dworkin's position to that of Rawls and Nozick,
see Dworkin & Magee, Three Concepts of Liberalism, NEW REPUBLIC, April 14,
1979, at 41. For critiques of liberalism, see S. HOOK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM
(1962); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL
MAN (1961); M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1967); R. WOLFF, THE
POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968). For one of the more sweeping critiques of
liberalism, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975) (identifying liberalism
with the underlying psychological, political, and epistemological strategies of modern
philosophy since Descartes). For a narrower analysis that in part parallels the
arguments of this article, see Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
621 (1982).
" I discuss the relationship between liberal theory and practice in Part VI. See also
Galston, supra note 1, at 627.
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to conceptions of the good life and conceptions of how persons ought to live
their lives. This notion is defended as the heart of liberalism by some of its
most thoughtful and rigorous proponents.3 Likewise, this idea is the primary
target of liberalism's most influential critics. 4
In Parts I and II I explain the relationship between political and moral
neutrality. The requirement that government be neutral with regard to con-
ceptions of the good life has two bases. One is the conviction that any
institutional preference is illegitimate because it rests on an illegitimate
moral judgment. Judgments about the superiority or inferiority of ways of
life are, in this view, unjustifiable in principle. The illegitimacy of the moral
judgment infects the consequent political judgment. A second basis for the
neutrality requirement is-that, even if moral judgments about ways of life can
be justified, any institutional preference is illegitimate because of the nature
of institutional constraint and power. Private moral positions should not, in
this view, be translated into institutional policies. In Part I I proffer evidence
that liberal theory is based on the first of these arguments. In Part II I
evaluate that evidence by drawing more clearly the distinction between the
two views.
Part III is a critique of the notion of moral neutrality as the basis for
liberalism. The examination unavoidably raises epistemological questions.
What do we know about human experience and how do we know it? Are
political and other judgments grounded in common sense or in the more
formalized learning of the social sciences? In what way is the social and
cultural self-understanding of man relevant to the liberal project and to
political and moral neutrality? I argue that these questions, however intract-
able, must be raised if the foundations of liberal theory are to be understood.
In Part IV I return to the alternative bases of liberal theory and political
neutrality to consider two special, but flawed, arguments about institutional
morality. One argument insists that political neutrality is mandated by equal-
ity. A second argument rests on the possibility of institutional abuse. I show
that the first argument is incoherent and the second, while coherent, man-
dates something less than political neutrality.
In Part V I use my examination of liberal theory to illuminate the concept
of freedom. I try to clarify the relationship between negative and positive
freedom and examine the role that political and moral neutrality plays in this
debate. In Part VI I summarize my conclusions about the relationship
between liberal theory and practice and the role of institutional neutrality in
the liberal political agenda.
I See Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 127; J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at
446-52.
4 See Galston, supra note 1, at 621-22; see also "Between Utility and Rights" and
"Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority" in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 148-247 (1983).
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I. INSTITUTIONAL NEUTRALITY AND HUMAN NATURE
A. Rawls, Dworkin and Neutrality
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, two of liberalism's most thoughtful and
influential contemporary exponents, rely on the notion of institutional neu-
trality as a basis for liberal theory. 5 Of course, any attempt to identify
liberalism with contemporary writers, let alone with just two writers of any
period, must run the gauntlet of predictable criticisms. Even the assumption
that Rawls and Dworkin share a single theory demands more qualifications
than I can set forth.
Rawls and Dworkin do not offer a theory of human nature.6 They claim to
be skeptical of the possibility of finding a determinate theory of human
nature ;7 for them liberalism is the political theory that best accomodates
such disquietude. 8 Their explicit concern is the moral justification of political
and legal constraint. 9 When does constraint constitute just, fair, or respectful
treatment? What kinds of constraint are compatible with diversity in pursuits
of the good life?10 Their central moral concern mandates that persons be
equally well-positioned in conceiving and carrying out their particular plans
of life."
Under this view of institutional neutrality, liberty is a political value with a
- See generally Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Believe in Equality, N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, Feb. 3, 1983, at 3 (insisting on moral neutrality only to the degree required by
the notion of equality); Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Jan. 20,
1983, at 47; Dworkin, What Is Equality, 10 PIIL. & PUB. AFF. 186 (1981) (dis-
cussing distributional equality and theories of equal resources and welfare);
J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 114.
6 See infra text following note 32, where I distinguish between "thick" and "thin"
theories of human nature.
7 See infra Part II.
8 In Parts II and III I explain and criticize the dependence of the liberal account of
neutrality on moral skepticism. In Part V I argue that Dworkin, among others, tries to
disassociate liberal neutrality from moral skepticism. Most liberal neutralists do not
believe that political activity, as opposed to political abstinence, is necessary for the
full realization of human potential. But what are the standards of human potential,
and how fully realized must a life be before it can be encompassed by a determinate
theory? I shall assume that a theory is determinate if it yields standards for judging
whether others are living well or badly. I will leave open the question of whether a
certain degree of moral responsiveness is a necessary part of living well.
I See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 272-75; J. RAWLS, supra note 1,
at 202.
'0 I have some reservations about the possible interpretations of the phrase "the
good life." I wish it to connote shared intuitions about ways of living, particularly
about what constitutes health and sickness, success and failure, and wisdom and
folly.
" See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 272-78; J. PAWLS, supra note 1, at 302.
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distinctive role; liberty may be limited for its own sake, but for no other
reason. 2 For example, when Rawls says that the right is prior to the good,' 3
he means that a particular plan of life is morally justifiable if it is constrained
by principles of justice under which everyone is equally well-positioned to
realize life plans within the context of certain basic liberties. Thus, the first
principle of justice is that "each person has an equal right to the most
extensive system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system for
all."" Dworkin's similar intuition is that the dispensation of political and
legal rights must flow from government's equal respect and concern for
individuals. Such rights must secure a system in which each person is
positioned to realize the set of personal preferences that constitutes his or
her individual conception of the good life.15
B. A Closer Look at Neutrality
Three dimensions of these views need further elaboration. First, the
distinctive role of liberty in current liberal theory is illuminated by the
tension between liberty and other values. Second, the neutralist account of
liberalism may be explained as a critical rejection of utilitarianism. And
third, the neutralist account implies an untenable view of human nature.
(1) Certainly any treatment of institutional neutrality must address the
inevitable clash between the value of liberty and other conflicting values.
The perennial balancing questions over conflicting exercises of liberty illus-
trate this point. For example, conflicts often arise between the freedom to
hold and use property and freedom of expression. (Consider, for example,
speechmaking or pamphleteering on the grounds of a private university or
shopping mall. 16) In addition, any treatment of liberty must distinguish be-
tween unconstrained actions that are morally justifiable and those that are
not. This second point is illustrated simply by the very existence of criminal
law, which condemns certain unconstrained actions as illegitimate uses of
liberty."
12 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 232-38; J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 60-65.
13 J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 446-52 (saying that considerations of right are prior to
considerations of the good is a way of saying justice is prior to utility).
14 Id. at 302.
" See Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 127-28.
16 E.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that
state protected right to petition and leaflet on private shopping mall property does not
infringe on property rights under the taking clause of the fifth amendment); Cologne
v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984) (holding that state
constitution permits political advocacy group to distribute leaflets on private shop-
ping mall grounds).
," This can be said about civil law as well. The criteria for criminalization are
controversial in two ways. Controversies can easily arise over what conduct should
be forbidden. In addition, there can be controversy over what it is that makes
criminal acts criminal, i.e., what general feature (harm?) they have in common.
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A theory of liberty can treat such balancing dilemmas in one of two ways.
First, liberty can be regarded as an instrumental value, its significance in a
particular act dependent on the significance of the end being pursued by that
act. Significant and protectable ends might include security, enlightenment,
and, in some instances, pleasure. The second approach, that chosen by
Dworkin and Rawls, takes liberty as an independent value, significant even if
we do not take into account the significance of other values or ends. Indeed,
under their approach, liberty is an independent value precisely because we
lack knowledge of the significance of other values.
In this second view, justifications for limiting or qualifying liberty must be
framed by an appeal to liberty itself."8 According to Dworkin, rights are not
to be understood and justified from an insight of the good life or from
any hierarchy of values." Rather, they are justified by equal respect for
individual lives and life plans. Such respect demands a procedure that heeds
personal preferences (A's conception of living well for himself), but not
external preferences (A's conception of how B should live).20 Thus, equal
respect really consists of maximizing the realization of each person's per-
sonal preferences to the extent possible without encroaching on others'
realization of their life plans.
Rawls embraces a similar conception of liberty. The principle of maximiz-
ing liberties2 has basic and constant priority over all other principles of
justice. This means that no increment in other values-general security or
welfare, for example-can justify a diminution of equally distributed basic
liberties.2
Why do Rawls and Dworkin regard liberty this way? Their shared intuition
18 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 208-21. I agree with Hart's interpreta-
tion of Dworkin. I am uncertain about the relationship between Dworkin's discussion
of external and personal preferences and his discussion of policies in legislative
decisionmaking. By properly determining and effecting policies, legislators are giving
political voice to external preferences.
'9 Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 128-40.
20 For a critique of this distinction, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 208-21; see
also Nickel, Dworkin on the Nature and Consequences of Rights, 11 GA. L. REV.
1115, 1125 (1977) (critiquing Dworkin's theory of external preferences); Richards,
Rules, Policies, and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law
and Controversial Adjudication, 11 GA. L. REV. 1069, 1090 (1977) (arguing that the
justification of principles, unlike social rules, need not depend on group acceptance).
21 See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 195-257 (chapter IV); H.L.A. HART, supra note
4, at 226-32. Hart's discussion of the distinction between liberty and basic principles
is very helpful. See also J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 61 (Rawls's initial account of the
notion of basic liberties).
22 See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 195-257 (chapter IV); H.L.A. HART, supra note
4, at 226-32. Hart's discussion points out complexities and subtleties in Rawls's
argument that I do not consider here.
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is that no one way of living deserves special moral preference in the institu-
tional fabric of society. Any such assignment would be arbitrary and in some
sense discriminatory." In developing this conception of liberty and neu-
trality Rawls and Dworkin presuppose that there are two levels of theory.
The first level is the attempt to describe the good life, to assign a moral
preference to one way of living. For Rawls and Dworkin, no such institu-
tional preference can be justified; all preferences are equally worthy of
respect. At the second level of theory is the justifiable preference for a
system that maximizes the realization of life plans. Dworkin repeatedly says
that the core of liberalism is that "government must be neutral on what
might be called the question of the good life." 2' In what follows I question
their distinction between these two levels of theory.*5
(2) The fundamental agreement between Rawls and Dworkin on the spe-
cial role of liberty helps us locate their account of liberalism on the map of
moral and political analyses. In particular it helps us understand their shared
rejection of utilitarianism. It is important to appreciate both what links them
to utilitarianism and what in it they reject.
Liberal theorists criticize utilitarianism for not taking seriously the indi-
vidual's own moral importance.26 The utilitarian's justification of action is
the collective common good. The welfare of any particular individual may in
principle be overridden for a sufficiently great benefit to the community. In
particular, each exercise of liberty or freedom is to be weighed against other
constituents of the common good. In utilitarianism, liberty does not have
constant priority as it does in Rawls's theory.2 7 Similarly, Dworkin's notion
of equal respect is intended as a corrective of the utilitarian "mistake." 2" He
attempts to explain the moral significance of individual choices and to refer
to the requisite conditions for melding conflicting life plans. At this level of
criticism, liberalism claims to address utilitarianism's failings.2 9
23 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
24 Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 127.
2. See infra Parts II, III and IV.
26 See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 94-100; J. RAWLS, supra note I, at
22-27.
27 Compare J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at § 82 (stating that liberty takes priority in
ideal circumstances, although urgent material acquisitions can have some priority in
nonideal circumstances) with J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 125-27 (1891) (arguing that
society is justified in enforcing upon each citizen a proportionate share of the labor
needed to free society from injury).
28 R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 199 (violations of human dignity, for
example, are said to have no place in a utilitarian account).
29 1 am not suggesting that the utilitarian cannot reply effectively to the liberal's
criticisms. Utilitarian writers have busied themselves with replies to Rawls and
Dworkin and with refinements to utilitarianism. See generally R. BRANDT, A
THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 214 (1979) (discussing the interplay between
rational choice and utilitarianism); Sen, Rawls Versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Ex-
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None of this can obscure the shared dimensions of this version of liberal
theory and utilitarianism. Both claim to be neutral with regard to differing
conceptions of the good life. Both identify living well with the realization of
life plans, whatever they may be. And each theory seems to have an arbitrary
stopping point. Liberal theory rests with the intuition that if no preference
can be justified, government must dispense rights so that all the governed are
equally well situated to realize their individual life plans. Utilitarian theory
rests with the intuition that if no preference can be justified, governments are
required to secure the optimal mix of collective satisfactions .30 Both intu-
itions, though not obviously untenable, are decidedly incomplete. What does
it mean for the liberal to say that persons should be equally well situated?
Should the content of the life plan be taken into account in determining
whether a person is situated as well as others? For example, should a life
plan that is evidently the product of self-delusion give rise to an inference
that the chooser is not well situated and that the government is obliged to
alter his circumstances? The liberal theorist would surely resist this kind of
intervention, but it is not clear what theoretical adjustments he would have
to make to accommodate this reservation. A utilitarian's response to this
problem, on the other hand, would be to decide whether intervention would
optimize the mix of collective satisfactions or, more simply, whether inter-
vention would make society as a whole better or worse off. This too is an
elusive task.
(3) There are several ways of characterizing the distinction between those
theorists that are and those that are not neutral with regard to a conception
of the good life. Dworkin, for example, identifies these respective poles
unpersuasively with liberalism and conservatism .3 But a theory that is not
neutral (one that commends a particular view of the good life) may be radical
amination of the Pure Distribution Problem, in READING RAWLS 283 (N. Daniels ed.
1974) (a comparison of the decision rules yielded by the Rawlsian conception of
justice and by classical utilitarianism).
30 For a discussion of utilitarianism as a maximizing theory, see Marshall,
Egalitarianism and the General Happiness, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANIsM 35
(H. Miller & W. Williams eds. 1982); see also S. SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 29 (1982) (arguing for a utilitarian conception of the collective
good that provides a standard by which "some human interests can be judged more
important than others").
31 See Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 128. Dworkin seems confused about
the nature of conservatism. In his discussion of the conservative's attitude toward a
market economy, he equates the dispositions of the utilitarian with those of the
conservative. The utilitarian would favor a market economy but the conservative
might well constrain it. Id. at 130. Dworkin undercuts his own position when he
suggests that neutral principles can equalize the unequal opportunities available to
individuals when seeking to realize their life plans. Id. at 132-33. It is unclear why the
methods that determine when individuals have unequal opportunities are not the
same methods that yield information about personal interests.
19861 1019
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66: 1013
or revolutionary rather than conservative. And a conservative theorist may
in certain ways espouse neutralism. In purporting to reject conservatism
generally, Dworkin rejects only the special strain of conservatism that treats
any consensus developed over time as meriting perpetuation because it is
the received tradition. This particular type of conservative theory is indeed
undermined by the insight that traditions can be the repository of prejudice
and inhumanity as well as of wisdom.3 2
Another way of characterizing the distinction is as follows. Liberal
theorists who offer a theoretical defense of neutrality characteristically rely
on what I call a "thin" theory of human nature. Conversely, critics of such
theorists can be said to rely on a "thick" theory. A thin theory is committed
only to the notion of persons as framers of a conception of the good life, as
loci of arbitrary preferences. Both liberals and utilitarians hold such a thin
theory. Living well, in this view, means being in a position to choose and to
satisfy one's choices. (The liberal distinguishes himself from the utilitarian
by drawing different implications from the thin theory for the special place of
liberty among values.) A thick theory, on the other hand, requires substan-
tive standards for what it is to live well.
Having now identified some marks of the liberal theorist's concept of
human nature and experience, with its emphasis on individuals as choosers
of life plans, I shall argue in Part II that this concept governs moral as well as
political judgment. The liberal theorists will be seen to offer a form of moral
skepticism. In Part III I criticize the concept of human nature and experi-
ence underlying this form of moral skepticism.
II. NEUTRALITY AND MORAL SKEPTICISM
The liberal theory of neutrality may be motivated by either political or
moral skepticism, two quite different rationales. Political skepticism ques-
tions the trustworthiness of governments and government officials and is not
a theory of human nature per se. Political skeptics hold that if governments
are allowed to allocate rights favoring a particular way of living, govern-
ments will abuse that power. Similarly, if persons are allowed political
expression of their opinions about how others should live, they too will
abuse that power.33 Accordingly, we cannot allow political institutions or
32 See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, 248-53.
33 I do not consider whether Dworkin intends his strictures to apply to the deci-
sions of legislators as well as judges and to citizens as well as officials. See id. at
89-90. Dworkin implies that judges, but not legislators, act improperly when they
employ a conception of society's interest as a whole (such as setting policy rather
than deciding on the basis of principle). Yet when Dworkin revises or refines this
distinction, and condemns the expression of external preferences, he discusses
legislators, citizens, and judges as actors in political roles.
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citizens as political actors to favor a particular view of the good life. The
possibility of coercion and abuse of those with different views of the good
life is too strong.3 The choice seems to be between limiting official power,
on the assumption that officials cannot moderate themselves, and limiting
the options of the governed, on the assumption that they might choose
badly. The political skeptic opts for the former. In this light, the agenda of
so-called political liberals fits liberal theory badly. The minimal role political
skeptics allow government is more easily fitted to a conservative agenda.3 5
Whatever its merits, however, political skepticism cannot explain the
position of Rawls and Dworkin. Political skepticism is an element of a
remedial or non-ideal theory of just government, not an element of an ideal
theory. Such skepticism anticipates political failure and tries to prevent it.
Rawls's theory, though, is explicitly non-remedial.36 For Rawls, liberty has
constant priority over other values, not for prophylactic reasons, but be-
cause of the just circumstances of political association.
Similarly, political skepticism is not what motivates Dworkin. Were he a
political skeptic he would be obliged to investigate the line between the use
and abuse of relevant knowledge about living well, obliged to distinguish
benign from malign external preferences. But he does not do so. To the
contrary, Dworkin wants to neutralize all effects of external preferences: all
use is abuse . 7
Thus, the form of liberalism found in Rawls and Dworkin is grounded not
on political skepticism but on moral skepticism.38 Liberals generally deny that
the criteria of the good life can ever be known. This is a view with a long
pedigree, and I can do no more here than evoke the more familiar elements
of the argument. One venerable basis is the so-called "is-ought" dilemma,
"' See J. MILL, supra note 27, at 29-39. See also R. WOLFF, supra note 1, at 19-21
(a lucid discussion of the ways in which Mill's position has been used to support both
welfare state liberalism and libertarianism).
31 Certainly the modern welfare state offers up a rich set of questions requiring
decision. Society must decide which aspects of human nature engender good citizen-
ship and therefore deserve encouragement.
36 See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 8-11 (analyzing the concept of social justice, not
the ways it can be achieved in ongoing, imperfectly just, societies).
31 See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 234-48; Dworkin, Liberalism, supra
note 1, at 134. Clearly Dworkin accepts this conclusion, which seems inherent in the
definition of personal and external preferences.
38 Dworkin argues that he is not a skeptic: "Liberalism cannot be based on
skepticism. Its constructive morality provides that human beings must be treated as
equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in political
morality, but because that is what is right." Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at
142. It should be clear that this does not answer the critic's charge that (a) any
meaningful understanding of equal treatment must involve judgments about original
opportunity, and (b) such judgments involve a determination of others' interests in
such a way that preferences (life plans) are not determinative of interests.
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which involves the claim that there is an unbridgeable gap between descrip-
tive and normative judgments, 9 No description of the world or of experience
can yield conclusions about what persons ought to do, particularly about
how they ought to live their lives. To be sure, a moral skeptic concedes that
we can investigate what makes people happy, what preferences people tend
to have, and what their bodily needs are. But this investigation cannot
determine whether persons ought to seek happiness (or how they ought to
seek it), whether they ought to satisfy preferences (or which preferences
they ought to satisfy), or whether they ought to be mindful of bodily needs.
It follows that man's accumulated knowledge is irrelevant to any conclu-
sion about what persons ought to do to achieve the good life. Is the good life
grounded in self-denial or self-indulgence? Perhaps one could decide this if
one could uncover a distinctive human function, just as one can conclude
that one has a good car in the light of the distinctive function of cars. But
persons are not artifacts like cars and, it is said, one cannot claim a distinc-
tive function for human beings.4°
To summarize, the fundamental maxim of liberal theory as moral skepti-
cism is that autonomy (the realization of individual identity)41 consists of
first, being able to act according to one's values, second, being the author of
a life plan, and third, being aware that one is the author of such a plan, that
one has this special kind of liberty. What distinguishes moral skepticism at
this point is the view that no normative judgments can be made about
particular life plans because there is no critical standpoint for evaluating
31 For the traditional source of this argument, see D. Hume, Treatise of Human
Nature, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 245-46 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1964).
See also Maclntyre, Hume on "is" and "ought", in THE Is-OUGHT QUESTION 36, 37
(W. Hudson ed. 1969) ("The standard interpretation [argues that] . . . Hume [is]
asserting . . . that no set of non-moral premises can entail a moral conclusion.").
Twentieth-century ethicists generally accepting Hume's argument include R. HARE,
LANGUAGE OF MORALS 29, 44 (1952); P. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 36-38 (1954); and
A. PRIOR, LOGIC AND THE BASIS OF ETHICS 32-33 (1949).
40 Attempts to theorize about the function of individuals (and the good life) are
likely to find methodological support in Aristotle. See R. SULLIVAN, MORALITY AND
THE GOOD LIFE: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 28-33
(1977) (explaining Aristotle's analysis of the components of human action). But
Aristotle is not the major naturalist targeted by Hume and others who employ the
"is-ought" argument.
41 Some of the assumptions in the Humean tradition of British empiricism parallel
those of twentieth-century European existentialism. For example, in J. SARTRE,
NAUSEA (1949) and A. CAMUS, THE STRANGER (1942), the overarching preoccupa-
tion is with radical freedom, the freedom to create through one's own choices
whatever moral universe there can be. In addition, one of Kant's major themes is the
individual's liberation from a personal history and submission to freely chosen rules
and principles. Kant is of course a major influence on Rawls. See generally I. KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 45 (C. Beck trans. 1956).
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them. Values exist within life plans, but life plans as a whole cannot be
ranked or judged by appeal to them. The implementation of external value
preferences, views about how others should live, are seen as usurpations of
personal autonomy.
The moral skepticism implicit in Rawls and Dworkin, which is at the heart
of modern liberalism, stands in stark contrast to a long tradition of liberal
thought. John Stuart Mill, the paradigmatic traditional liberal theorist, was
essentially a political skeptic.4 2 For him, critical standpoints for making
moral judgments did exist. But Mill believed that the resulting models of the
good life should not be embodied in the rules of political association. 43 Such
rules, justified as being for the good of others, may be attacked as paternalis-
tic.
III. A CRITIQUE OF MORAL NEUTRALITY AND MORAL SKEPTICISM
A. Knowledge About Values
Rawls and Dworkin do not claim to be moral skeptics. My suggestion that
they are moral skeptics despite themselves is based on what is missing from
their work as much as on what is there. For a non-skeptic, it is possible to
know the criteria for living well and successfully. Obtaining such knowledge
undercuts moral neutrality by undermining the notion that all life plans are
equally worthy of respect and that equal respect of persons entails equal
regard for their capacities as autonomous and self-conscious choosers of life
plans. I shall consider how an argument for such knowledge can be made and
what its (superable) obstacles are.
More than a quarter of a century ago, H.L.A. Hart, following David
Hume,' referred to the minimal content of natural law, those few universal
features of social experience that could be expected to shape the basic
content of virtually all legal systems.4 5 Predictably, social experience uni-
versally recognizes and responds to such needs as food, shelter, and secu-
rity.46 Hart's list was hardly an advance over the list Hume compiled 200
42 The interpretation of Mill on this matter is controversial. Chapter Two of ON
LIBERTY, supra note 27, is largely given over to a description of the ways in which
governments have abused their power over individuals and a warning that they are
generally likely to do so. In Chapter Four, on the other hand, Mill implies that
individuals are typically the best judges of their own interest. But throughout the
entire discussion he never takes the position of a moral skeptic.
43 See J. MILL, supra note 27, at 125-33.
1 D. Hume, supra note 39, at § 2.
45 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961). Hart appears to
consider it a virtue of his account that the minimal content of natural law rests on a
truism about human nature. It is difficult to see why more sophisticated and contro-
versial claims about human nature (drawn from psychology, anthropology, etc.) might
not also be candidates for foundational theories.
4Id.
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years earlier. It selected only timeless, uncontroversial, and self-evident
features of experience. Yet if these features would have been as evident to
an observer at the dawn of history as they are to a contemporary, one might
ask whether there are other such features that have been uncovered through
the cumulative activity of human imagination. Why are the efforts to under-
stand human nature by philosophers, artists, and others irrelevant? Though
the liberal as moral skeptic is committed to perceiving such resources as
meager and even nonexistent, an observer without skeptical bias might think
them inexhaustible.
Two points undermine the skepticism that buttresses a commitment to
neutrality. First, Hart's modest argument bridges the abyss between de-
scriptive and normative discourse. Hart's point is not just that legal systems
happen to respond to certain human needs and that some of those needs
happen to be widespread. Hart says it is a "natural necessity" that the law
serves these needs ." For Hart, this truth about the law is contingent merely
on the plausible notion of "human beings and the world they live in retaining
the salient characteristics which they [now] have." 4
Secondly, any political program, even one predicated explicitly on neu-
trality, is in fact a normative constraint on the function of legal systems. To
be sure, a program based on Hart's minimum content for legal systems does
not in itself subvert neutrality. The features Hart picks out are not in
themselves incompatible with a scheme that is basically neutral among life
plans. However, the full political agenda that espouses neutrality must fail
by its own standards to the extent that it misconceives the normative
character of governing in general. Thus, there is inevitably a reservoir of
shared knowledge about human nature and successful living. Equally inevi-
tably, those who govern will have to draw on that reservoir.
Our cultural products survive, when they do, presumably because they
both reflect and generate widely shared satisfactions and understandings.
Novels, plays, movies, and other art forms not only express what we are but
shape and alter our self-understanding. This process has been described as a
hermeneutic circle .49 Philosophical skepticism notwithstanding, there is no
shortage of analyses that try to make explicit what is implicit in a given
culture. It is probably a truism to say that social and political culture reflects
and molds self-understanding. Our fundamental decisions-what we choose
41 Id. at 195.
48 Id.
49 A traditional hermeneutic circle describes how the whole and the part, in the
process of learning, are related in a circular way: in order to understand the whole it
is necessary to know the parts, and in order to teach the parts it is necessary to know
the whole. See D. Hoy, THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS Vii, 166-68 (1978); see also H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND




to criminalize, how we choose to house, feed, medicate, and educate, for
example-are all arenas of substantial consensus as well as arenas of con-
troversy ."
B. Naturalism and Relativism
What does this tell us? What does the attempt to understand human nature
over time and in the face of diversity yield? It is easy to identify the Scylla
and Charybdis of this task. On one hand, a unified image of the fully realized
good life can be drawn from cultural representations of health and pathol-
ogy, and from theories of psychology, sociology, and pedagogy. On the
other hand, this image is arguably shattered by the simultaneous flourishing
of mystical religious fundamentalism and earthbound Western humanism.
The list of contrasting views of the good life is almost endless. The attempt
to describe human nature, to be a naturalist, seems to falter in the face of
relativism. And the relativist is, of course, the liberal theorist as moral
skeptic.
The naturalist has several replies to relativism. The first is to argue that
Western culture represents a powerful consensus. If one can trace a continu-
ing thread in the dialogue over the nature of the good life from Aristotle
through Freud and Kant, from Milton to Tolstoy and Bellow, from
Michelangelo to Picasso, then perhaps the view of human nature arising
from this "discussion" is to be taken more seriously than others. A second
reply is that the naturalist is not trying to give an account of human nature
valid for all times and places, but one valid for those times and places where
categories of judgment involve arguments for and against liberalism. They
are necessarily part of the so-called Western humanist tradition. Third, the
theory of human nature that the naturalist is willing to defend may be
expressed in subjective rather than objective characteristics and therefore
may more convincingly be said to be universal. It may use notions like
self-control, satisfaction, and self-knowledge, virtues like honesty and kind-
ness. Such notions of success and failure in living are arguably trans-
cultural.
I shall not take these three possible bases for naturalism any further,
although I think each has merit. I want instead to consider a fourth reply,
namely, that naturalism and relativism are not truly alternative positions at
all. This view is that naturalism is a position that is the spontaneous expres-
sion of one's cultural and personal history. Each individual's personal his-
tory recapitulates to some extent the culture's history, the rediscovery of the
cultural, social, and personal assumptions which give rise to standards of
50 At times agreement seems to predominate; one can rest assured of a general
dismissal of radical dissenters. At other times the range of possible alternatives
seems very wide and there can be much disagreement. See generally J. FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (discussing the nature of value con-
sensus).
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judgment. Such standards are expressed as knowledge about when others
are acting in their own interest or against it, when they are flourishing or
suffering. Relativism, on the other hand, is an unnatural position because it
mandates standardlessness and commends agnosticism toward any knowl-
edge of human flourishing, of success and failure.
It is easy to misunderstand this point. I am not giving a reason for
embracing naturalism and rejecting relativism. My point is more complicated
because it is dialectical. Though we live within a particular culture, we are
compelled to be, at the same time, distanced from it. While holding and
employing values, we simultaneously question them and know how limitedly
we can defend them. We question the unknown or partially known reasons
for our beliefs. This is to say that the values of self-examination and self-
criticism have special roles in our culture. They are, from the naturalist point
of view, ingredients necessary for living what many regard as a rational and
successful way of life. But they tend to undercut their own ground by making
it inevitable that we see the allure of relativism as a challenge to any
confident assertion of particular values as "natural."
C. Liberalism Reconceived
It is time to return to the critique of liberalism. Given that standards of
judging are spontaneous and inevitable, we must be able to make two
distinctions. The first is between knowledge about well-being and mere
preferences. It is one thing for me to prefer the company of A; it is quite
another to know that I am better off with A. It is one thing to prefer that
others live in a certain way; it is another to know that they are better off if
they live that way. The liberal theorists who share Dworkin's framework
must assume that the distinction is empty and that there are only prefer-
ences. (This is simply a restatement of moral skepticism and the need for
value neutrality.) A second, closely related distinction is between prefer-
ences and interests. What one prefers is not necessarily in one's interest. 51
One's preferences about how others should live are not the same as a
judgment about what is in their interest. While I do not deny that these
distinctions are full of snares, I suggest only that the categories are intelligi-
ble and useful.
To make these distinctions is to claim that the perspective from which
one uses such standards of judgment cannot be abandoned. The liberal
theorist qua moral skeptic would have us move to a position of neutrality
about the interests of others and the merits of life plans, but we cannot do so.
This observation has distinctive implications from three points of view.
For one thing, the idea of personal freedom or liberty must be rethought.
Liberty is not the liberty to determine, from a blank tablet, what one shall be
and do and what values one shall have. It is rather the liberty to frame and
51 See Schwartz, Human Welfare: What It Is Not, in THE LIMITS OF UTILITAR-
IANISM 195 (H. Miller & W. Williams eds. 1982).
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carry out choices within the history and values that one discovers and
reappropriates .52
For the observer, neutrality is not available. This is not to say that the
observer inevitably has a conception of the good life, of a particular mix of
values and activities that mark the flourishing of human nature.5 It is to say
that he will inevitably be using and struggling with standards for judging, and
will be trying to distinguish interests shared by mankind from interests that
are personal and idiosyncratic. This will lead him to do what is incompatible
with neutrality, to try to judge how well others know their own interests, and
how close they are to satisfying them. Ideally, such judging will be done with
discretion and care, and with respect for the freedom to experiment and err. o
Neutrality in action, expressed by the refusal to intervene except in excep-
tional circumstances, is not the same as neutrality in judgment; the latter is a
mirage.
Finally, the point of view of the political or legal decisionmaker is a special
instance of the point of view of the observer. Because of her special power to
affect others, the decisionmaker must be especially respectful of idiosyn-
cratic choices. She must also know that political institutions exist in part
because wisdom about human affairs or knowledge about interest may not
coincide with the popular will. If that is so, she cannot defer equally to all life
plans. Moreover, any political decision resets the stage and adversely affects
someone's life plan.
IV. POLITICAL NEUTRALITY AND EQUALITY
A. The Argument for Neutrality as Equal Respect
To this point I have interpreted modem liberal theory as (1) advocating
political neutrality, (2) based on moral neutrality regarding ways of living,
and (3) mandated by moral skepticism. I also considered the possibility of
justifying political neutrality on the basis of political rather than moral
skepticism. However, the severance of political neutrality from moral skep-
ticism requires further examination.
In his recent writings Dworkin has explicitly denied that he is a moral
skeptic. 54 His arguments are initially appealing. He says he rejects the idea
52 Analogies to the psychoanalytic model of human nature are relevant. See
G. KLEIN, PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY, AN EXPLORATION OF ESSENTIALS 275-79
(1979) (pointing out that human activity combines mere motor activity with a subjec-
tive self-conception).
'3 This is a centuries-old criticism of natural law theories. It would be interesting to
trace the historical roots of Dworkin's disclaimers of a theory of the good life and his
claims that there is a "right answer" to judicial questions. See R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 279-90 (chapter 13).
"' See Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, supra note 5, at 47.
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that neutrality is justified by moral skepticism in favor of the idea that
neutrality is based on a commitment to equality. Institutional neutrality is
mandated by equality because neutrality is a way of showing respect for
persons as equals, and any institutional preference for one way of living over
another discriminates invidiously among persons. Since this argument, in
one form or another, is one with which most liberals are familiar and to
which many are sympathetic, it is important to see whether neutrality based
on equality is a camouflaged form of moral skepticism or a genuine alterna-
tive to it.
Consider how Dworkin tries to demonstrate that he is not a moral skeptic.
He argues that even if liberalism is neutral about ways of living, it need not
be neutral about "what would count as a good society":
Liberals can (and do) believe that politics should aim at a society of
people who are happy rather than miserable, who respect rather than
condemn one another, and who have an imaginative rather than a
conformist approach to the question of what kinds of lives they should
lead. Still less does it mean that politics must be neutral among princi-
ples of justice.55
But can politics aim at these goals and, at the same time, be neutral with
regard to ways of living? Consider three responses that might show how this
can be so, thus saving Dworkin's view from inconsistency.
First, one might hold that all ways of living lead equally well to happiness
rather than misery, to mutual respect rather than condemnation. Clearly this
is implausible. Obsessive lives with unattainable goals lead to misery rather
than happiness; lives grounded in bigotry and self-righteousness are appro-
priately condemned. The project of respecting all life patterns equally will
tend to undermine the "good society."
A second response is that any conscientious effort by the government to
differentiate among ways of living will cause more unhappiness, more disre-
spect, and more conformity than a strict policy of maintaining neutrality.
This too is hardly persuasive. A sincere and well-grounded policy of foster-
ing open-minded and imaginative living is not certain to backfire. Some such
policies will work better than others, but it is hard to see why the principle is
misconceived ab initio.
Clearly, Dworkin has a third and more subtle response in mind. He is
prepared to concede that some policies of fostering open-mindedness-and
encouraging mutual respect are properly part of a liberal program. Yet, in
Dworkin's view, such policies do not breach the requirement of neutrality. It
is hard to see how this can be so, although it is easy to see what examples
Dworkin would cite to support his thesis. A proper policy of neutrality, by
his lights, is one in which no particular religious preference is favored by




ence are equally protected by the law.56 His policy of neutrality is one in
which the government does not approve of some cultural activities and
proscribe others. In these ways, official neutrality is likely to foster happi-
ness, diversity, and mutual respect.
Dworkin's response is nonetheless weak. It resolves the apparent incon-
sistency in liberalism only by assuming that all kinds of religious practices,
styles of living, and cultural practices are equally conducive to happiness
and respect both for practitioners and for society at large. Homosexuals can
be as happy (or unhappy) as heterosexuals. Lovers of punk rock can find as
much enjoyment in their preferences as lovers of Bach. This may well be the
case, but it is a stream of argument that rapidly runs dry when considerations
other than potential happiness are at issue. Certainly not all kinds of reli-
gious practice and belief are equally conducive to a secular or political
context of toleration and mutual respect. Not all styles of familial organiza-
tion are likely to foster lives of imagination rather than conformity.
Thus, Dworkin's notion of neutrality is doubly vulnerable. First, it con-
fuses respect for persons with blindness toward the perhaps destructive
effects of the ways they may choose to live. Although this kind of liberal
would like to think that all choices of sexual preference, cultural practice,
and religious belief are equally congenial to a regime of mutual respect, it is
not obvious that this is correct.57 Even if it is, there is a second problem. The
resolution cannot go as far as the liberal wants it to go, to toleration of the
intolerant. It follows that the liberal must choose between neutrality on one
hand and a political disposition that aims "at a society of people who are
happy rather than miserable, who respect rather than condemn one an-
other," 58 on the other.
B. Freeing Choosers and Determining Choices
Dworkin has available one final argument, an argument which draws in a
different way on the claim that political neutrality is based on equality. This
56 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 240-48 (discussing Lord
Devlin's controversial position on law and morality).
51 It is important to distinguish several points. First, I am certainly not denying
that one may plausibly hold that religion A and religion B, or sexual preference A and
sexual preference B, are equally conducive to happiness or successful living. I am
merely suggesting that this type of argument is weak because it involves gener-
alizations about heterogenous classes and their unmeasurable features. Second, the
liberal's best argument is to concede that the possibility of happiness in these cases is
indeterminable, and to argue for the desirability of free choice on that basis. Third,
this point does not mean that all information is irrelevant to such choices. One can
argue that, in the choice between a life of addiction to drugs and a drug-free life, the
advantages of the latter are so clear as to permit government interventions. Cases
must be decided on their individual merits; no general rule of neutrality seems to be
supported by general intuitions.
-58 Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, supra note 5, at 47.
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is to deny that equal respect means equal respect for one's choices, and to
concede that a liberal cannot respect the choice of religious intolerance or
personal bigotry. 9 Rather, equal respect means respect for persons as
choosers. It involves separating the chooser from the choice, respecting the
autonomy of the individual as a chooser but not necessarily respecting what
the individual becomes if he chooses to be a bigot, fanatic, or conformist.
Accordingly, neutrality and respect mandate policies that free the avenues of
choice.
This gets us back to liberal theory's flawed characterization of the rela-
tionship between persons and life plans" Dworkin's last point assumes that
we can isolate judgments about conditions that prevent one from being a free
chooser from judgments about the choices that are actually made. It assumes
that government can intervene only to overcome conditions of the first kind.
In this view, government can provide subsistence and education because
these conditions set the background for choice and involve no breach of
neutrality. Government thus does not delimit choice but leaves the individ-
ual free to "make" herself at the moment of choice into a homosexual, a
zealot, or a devotee of the Rolling Stones.
The difficulty with this argument is that there is no way to distinguish
those permissible interventions that raise a person to the plateau of becom-
ing a free chooser from those impermissible interventions that violate neu-
trality by conditioning and shaping the choice. Of course, some interven-
tions are easy to classify. Requiring early education in communication skills
does contribute to making one a self-aware chooser. Outlawing homosexual
acts does limit the range of choices. But most interventions defy classifica-
tion because the values of open-mindedness, self-control, tolerance, and
rational thinking are both preconditions of choice and desired values. Setting
the conditions for achieving such virtues involves a clear violation of neu-
trality. Either we can try to secure the conditions of mutual respect or we
can be neutral, but we cannot be both.
Dworkin says that the ideal of neutrality is preserved when "it cannot
count, as a justification for any decision about the political... structure of
our society, that either of us is inherently superior to the other, or that
either's idea of a valuable life is superior." 6' But the liberal cannot preserve
that ideal. The conclusion that he cannot do so can be expressed in two
ways, as we have seen. First, one can say that the liberal must be commit-
ted, on pain of contradiction, to regarding as superior that idea of a valuable
life that best comports with autonomous choice and mutual respect. Second,
and more radically, one can say that the determination of when one is so
59 R. DwORKIN, RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 275-78.
60 See supra Parts I and II. I reject the notion of individuals as simple and
autonomous choosers of life plans. The process of growth and development is a
mixture of interdependent internal and external forces and opportunities.
61 Dworkin, What Liberalism Isn't, supra note 5, at 48.
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situated that one can frame the "idea of a valuable life" freely is conditioned
by determinations about what sorts of lives are superior to others. In either
case, the ideal is unattainable.
It follows that political neutrality remains undefended as a tenet of liberal
theory. On one hand, it cannot be supported by moral skepticism if moral
skepticism is itself indefensible, resting on a false picture of experience and
judgment. On the other hand, it cannot be supported by the requirement of
equal respect. The creation and maintenance of a political structure in which
respect is sustained requires that genuine self-reflection and autonomy be
fostered. If respect is taken seriously, government can be neutral only
among those choices that are genuine avenues of such self-realization.
C. Political Skepticism Reconsidered
Consider again political skepticism. 62 This view concedes that we can
choose among ways of living, and that we know which ways are more likely
to be successful, happy, and worthy of respect. But the political skeptic
holds that governments are likely to botch the job. Neutrality is offered as a
prophylactic policy. While political skepticism is a coherent and persuasive
argument, it is hard to accept as a general and uniform truth. A government
that should not be trusted to endow and favor particular forms of cultural
expression might well be trusted to provide the conditions for mental and
physical health. While governments can certainly abuse the mandate to
secure, for example, conditions of mental and physical health, the likelihood
of such abuse cannot be determined as a matter of principle. Some judg-
ments about health needs are more controversial than others. Some inter-
ventions are more disruptive than others, and some are more likely to be
freely accepted by the beneficiary. Certainly, governments that would inter-
vene bear a heavy moral burden of proof. But that is a far cry from moral
skepticism, from saying that we cannot in principle know what conditions
are better or worse, or that we must advocate political neutrality because
that is how we secure the conditions of mutual respect. It is also a far cry
from saying that even the wisest and most benign government will inevitably
guess wrong.
V. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOM
A. The Relationship Between Negative and Positive Freedom
The debate among political theorists about "two concepts of freedom,"
stirred if not initiated by Isaiah Berlin,6 3 provides an opportunity to clarify
my critique of the neutrality of liberal theory. First, consider Gerald MacCal-
62 See supra Part II.
63 Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
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lum's convincing argument that freedom (or liberty)64 always posits a triadic
set of relations such that A (an actor) is free from B (some constraint) to do
C (an act, a range of actions, etc.) .65 Negative and positive freedom, there-
fore, are not two distinct concepts so much as they are different aspects of
the single notion of constraint. The proponent of negative freedom holds that
one is free to the extent one is not prevented by law or other governmental
intervention from doing what one chooses to do. The proponent of positive
freedom maintains that freedom is only enjoyed by the person who, in
addition, is free of internal constraint. This implies that she possesses the
conditions of self-realization. Charles Taylor lists these conditions as self-
awareness, self-understanding, moral discrimination, and self-control."
Negative freedom is not necessarily the absence of rules. It follows from
the strict definition of negative freedom that persons have more freedom in a
state of nature than in a civil society with, for example, criminal prohibi-
tions. One can kill or steal only in a state of nature. But those who would kill
and steal exercise their freedom by undercutting the freedom of their vic-
tims. Thus the proponent of negative freedom must choose between anarchy
and civil society with its prohibitions on the freedom to prey on others.
Choosing the latter maximizes only significant exercises of freedom, not
indiscriminate or licentious exercises of freedom.
B. Semantic Issues
Before exploring the implications of the two concepts let us clarify some
semantic issues. Consider first the different nuances of liberty and freedom.
Liberty seems to be a political virtue. Liberties are conceded to citizens by
the state (in a bill of rights, for example) and safeguarded by the state.
Liberty in the state of nature is a self-contradictory notion. Freedom, on the
other hand, is more general, and liberty seems to be a special kind of
freedom. One can talk about freedom and constraint in the state of nature as
well as in civil society. In this section, I have chosen to consider freedom
rather than liberty because it is the more comprehensive notion.
A second issue is that the term "freedom" is obviously used in mutually
incompatible ways, ways that support both negative and positive theories of
freedom. On one hand we say that a person must be free to make mistakes,
free to be self-deluded or ignorant. On the other hand, we espouse positive
freedom when we say that one is not really free if she lacks relevant
information or suffers from self-delusion. We speak of freeing someone from
ignorance. Usage, therefore, will not resolve the debate.
6" MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 174 (4th Series, P. Laslett, W. Runciman, & Q. Skinner eds. 1972).
65 Id. at 176.
11 Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 179
(A. Ryan ed. 1979).
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A third point about the use of these concepts is that, contrary to McCal-
lum's suggestion, the debate is not a question of value disguised as a
question of fact. He argues that questions about when persons are free and
what is to count as an interference with freedom are confused with questions
about when persons are best left to act freely and what is a legitimate
interference with freedom.67 He concludes that proponents in the debate can
agree on answers to the factual questions and can agree to disagree about the
values, about what is best and what is legitimate. This, for MacCallum, is the
real underlying debate.
MacCallum is wrong insofar as theorists of negative freedom often claim
to make factual points when they deny the existence of inner constraints.
They claim to believe that the existence of inner constraints has nothing to
do with freedom. They assume that inner constraints are so speculative that
any attempt to deal with them is tantamount to imposing (what Dworkin
calls) an external preference on another. The response to MacCallum is that
it is far from clear that we can distinguish questions of fact from questions of
value in this area, and that it may be senseless to try to do so.
This point can be clarified by linking it to moral skepticism since, as we
have seen, the strategy of separating fact from value is a cherished strategy
of the moral skeptic .6' Applying this strategy to the problem of negative and
positive freedom, the skeptic might conclude with MacCallum that the
debate is about values, about the range of the three variables discussed
above. The disagreement would be about what interventions are legitimate,
and about when persons are best left alone. The moral skeptic concludes that
these determinations are expressions of personal preference and that free-
dom truly exists when we decline to apply our personal preferences to
others.
The response to the moral skeptic is that the existence and nature of inner
constraints is a factual matter, and only the theorist of positive freedom is
willing to consider inner constraints. The skeptic's (and MacCallum's) dis-
tinction between questions of fact and questions of value is unhelpful and
untenable. In particular, it cannot be used by the proponent of negative
freedom to defend his view that all attempts to affect inner constraints are
illegitimate applications of preferences.
I addressed this strategy of labeling facts as mere value preferences
above when I defended the distinction between knowledge and external
preference and between interest and personal preference .69 Just as we know
that it is not in the interest of persons to be enslaved or to be told how they
must use their property or their leisure, we know that it is not in their interest
to be ignorant; lack self-awareness, or be without self-control. We do not
merely prefer that they be self-aware. (We may, in fact, prefer that those
67 MacCallum, supra note 64, at 192.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
" See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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whom we would exploit not be self-aware.) Our justifiable actions affecting
others are based on our knowledge about their own interests and their
well-being, not on our mere external preferences. Sometimes we are more
clearly aware of the interests of others than they are themselves.70 Freedom,
as the notion of positive freedom demonstrates, is best realized when the
actor's preferences and interests coincide.The proponent of negative free-
dom, like the liberal theorist who stresses neutrality, claims not to have a
theory of human nature. Yet if my analysis is correct, he is committed to one
that makes tacit hormative judgments about external constraints, a theory
that is implausible because it denies that internal constraints can alienate a
person's actions from her interests .71
C. Neutrality and Positive Freedom
I have said nothing yet about neutrality or the particular role of govern-
ment in the realization of freedom. The liberal neutralist may concede that
there are external constraints and still argue that, to maximize freedom,
government could abandon neutrality with regard to the external, but not the
internal, constraints of the governed. There are three arguments for this
position, and each can be refuted.
The first is that each individual's choice is an expression of that person's
values, and that no critical standpoint exists for judging these choices except
from the critic's own arbitrary preferences. This is the position of the moral
skeptic, and I have shown why this is inadequate.7 2
The second argument draws on the notion of equal respect. It says that,
whether or not there exists a moral standpoint for criticizing the choices of
others, equal respect mandates treating the governed as equally competent
choosers once the government has provided a plateau of opportunity. From
this plateau choices made are without external constraint.
70 This point can be easily abused. A fuller treatment is given in Taylor, supra note
66, at 187-89.
71 To be sure, we describe the effects of the two kinds of constraint in different
ways. When the constraint is external, we tend to say that the person is unable to act
on her interest, but also unable to realize her preference. When the constraint is
internal, we tend to say she acts on her preference, and that it is adverse to her
interest. But there are exceptions even to these conventions of usage. An external
constraint that is not physical, but economic or psychological, can affect preferences
so that the actor prefers to remain constrained. The exploited employee can come to
prefer the system of exploitation to destitution while unemployed. Similarly, an
internal constraint may not necessarily work by affecting preferences. Lack of
self-control may lead the actor to do neither what is in her interest nor what she
prefers. In any case, the most helpful insight in all these examples is the identification
of freedom with the capacity to recognize and pursue one's interests. The theorist of
positive freedom is better able to represent these several dimensions of freedom.
72 See supra Part III.
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For reasons given in Part IV, it is unclear how this notion of respect is to
be interpreted and why it should be compelling. One of the undisputed
grounds of the argument is that some external conditions, such as compul-
sory education and mandatory treatment for the severely self-destructive,
provide the necessary plateau for unconstrained choice. Yet this concedes
my basic point; external conditions necessarily reshape one's internal pref-
erences and the characterization of one's available personal choices. If basic
interventions in the areas of education and health are justified, where is the
line to be drawn? Certainly many other types of well-intentioned interven-
tions, likely to put persons in touch with their own-interests, could also be
justified as a manifestation of respect. There is no clear distinction between
setting the conditions for identifying one's interests and setting the condi-
tions that predetermine which interests will seem most compelling. The
internal constraints of self-awareness and self-control are not merely condi-
tions of choice. The attempt to secure them as conditions will also shape the
choices that are made. Thus, respect for individuals should not be identified
solely with neutrality; rather, it should be identified with the maintenance of
conditions that foster self-awareness and self-control, both as conditions of
choice and as aspects of the very choices that are made.
The third argument is the argument of the political skeptic. In this view the
institutions of the state are suited to securing protection from external but
not internal constraint. David Cooper, writing on positive and negative
freedom, says that the genuinely free man "will think that it is through
education, culture, and most of all personal endeavor--rather than through
legal and political arrangements-that his freedom will be won."73 The
distinction is useful but in part artificial. Political institutions determine the
character of education and culture. The question is not whether, but how,
education and culture are affected by political policies. No government,
under the guise of respect for neutrality, can disclaim responsibility for how
education and cultural opportunities appear to its citizens.
Nonetheless, Cooper's distinction between education and culture on one
hand and political arrangements on the other is helpful. We have seen that in
dealing with external constraint, political institutions alleviate constraint by
constraining. This is not a paradox. Laws constrain persons, either officials
or private individuals, from constraining others. Thus, governments are
constrained from interfering with free expression. Internal constraints, on
the other hand, are not typically removed by political external constraint.
External constraints involve two agents, she who would interfere and she
who would be the victim of interference. The first is constrained so that the
second is free. With internal constraints, there is only one agent, and it
seems paradoxical to think that one can be forced to be free. The notion, to
be sure, is not incoherent and has clearest application in the compulsory
treatment of those who, through temporary derangement, would do violence
" Cooper, The Free Man, in OF LIBERTY 134 (A. Griffith ed. 1983).
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to themselves. It is also arguably appropriate as a characterization of com-
pulsory education. But the notion will not go very far. Self-awareness and
self-control are dispositions that must be nurtured, not elicited by command.
In this way, Cooper is correct that culture and education, not politics and
law, are the appropriate arenas for such nurture.74
VI. THEORY AND PRACTICE
I raised at the outset the question of how closely liberal practice is to be
identified with the theory of neutrality. Given the scope of this article, I
cannot do this question full justice. I shall look briefly at only two aspects of
this question, first, whether liberal practice seems to presuppose the theory
of neutrality, and second, whether the theory of neutrality seems to imply
liberal practice.
(1) Dworkin lists some of the elements of liberal practice or policy when
he says that liberals are generally thought to be "for greater economic
equality, for internationalism, for freedom of speech and against censorship,
for sharper separation of church and state, for greater procedural protection
for accused criminals, for decriminalization of 'morals' offenses ... and for
an aggressive use of the central government power to achieve these goals."
75
Putting aside whether these goals are mutually compatible or whether they
are still part of the liberal agenda, the question remains: are they best
realized through the principle of governmental neutrality, or are they better
seen as the embodiment of a particular recommended kind of life?
It is tempting to try to reconcile the two positions by saying that the
program does embody a particular ideal, encouraged by government, and
that the ideal is simply freedom of choice. This is ambiguous. The principle
of neutrality is captured by this reformulation only if freedom is understood
as radical freedom. Each element of the liberal program can then be seen as a
way of making it more likely that persons are free to choose their values, to
live without determination. But if the idea of radical freedom is a chimera,
then the underlying conception of liberal practice seems to be that certain
determinants of choice are properly seen as constraints and are to be mini-
mized, while other determinants are to be seen as appropriate cultural
preconditions of choice. The liberal thus claims to know that persons are
r4 Consider one last possible misunderstanding. The notion of freedom as positive
freedom is not the same as the notion of radical or absolute freedom. Radical freedom
couples the conclusion that there are internal as well as external constraints with the
suggestion that to be truly free is to be free from the influence of others. We have
already seen why this romantic notion is a chimera. See Taylor, supra note 66, at
180-81. Just as we must distinguish our preferences from interests, we must distin-
guish constraints from historical and personal determinants that have become part of
our nature. It is helpful to recall that for the relativist, all life plans are of equal value.
Similarly, for the proponent of radical freedom, all determinants are constraints.
71 Dworkin, Liberalism, supra note 1, at 113.
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best off when they are made aware of a plurality of nonofficial religions,
when different kinds of cultural products clamor for their attention, when
they are aware of themselves as choosers among such options and strive for
self-knowledge and self-control. The liberal not only claims to know this
about others; he also claims to know that it is valuable for the individual to
know this about herself or himself. If liberals thus try to create institutions
that fortify a particular conception of human nature, their theory is badly
misrepresented by the ideal of neutrality.
(2) The second question is whether Rawls's and Dworkin's theory of
neutrality implies anything like the elements of the liberal agenda. The
discussion in Part IV suggests that it does not, and that the theory of
neutrality is indeterminate with regard to political agenda.
One way of developing this idea further is to take seriously the concept,
dear to the liberal neutralist, of a plateau of choice from which a life plan can
be projected. The neutralist has the burden of saying which interventions are
justifiable because they raise persons to that plateau, and whicfi are not
justifiable because they predetermine the choices that would be made once
the plateau is reached. But it is quite arbitrary how a particular intervention
is classified. From one point of view freedom of expression and economic
redistribution make choice equally available. From another they mean that
the loudest or most powerful voices will shape public opinion.
These remarks need three final qualifications. First, the distinction among
politicians will not be between those who are for and those who are against
freedom of expression or economic redistribution. It will be among those
who would support different systems of free expression and redistribution.
Second, I emphasize that I am in no way criticizing the liberal agenda or
saying that it cannot be justified. My point is only that it must be defended by
arguing from a completely articulated theory of human interests and experi-
ence on which it rests, not by denying that it rests on such a theory. Third, a
resolution of the controversy among differing attitudes toward, for example,
free expression, must begin by conceding that any system of free expression
enhances awareness of alternative courses of action, but also shapes the
world in which those courses exist, cutting off other imaginable courses of
action and shaping the attitudes of the chooser. This is the truth that the
relativist is concerned to convey. It is, as we have seen, a partial truth. The
naturalist reminds us that, however self-critically we do so, we also inhabit a
set of standards that allows us to judge just what realizations of freedom
contribute to the fullest realization of human nature.
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